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Introduction
Most comparisons between Berkeley and Hobbes begin by
highlighting their differences in metaphysics. On the one hand,
Berkeley argues that the concept of matter is unintelligible
because matter is supposed by its adherents to exist apart from
what we sense (i.e. our ideas); and, since we cannot think of
anything (including matter) other than in terms we understand
(i.e. as objects of thought), nothing that is truly independent of
thought is intelligible. On the other hand, Hobbes assumes that
only material objects are intelligible because they alone are
sensible objects of experience; since we cannot think of anything
(including minds and their acts) other than in terms of the
material things we sensibly experience, nothing that is truly
independent of matter is intelligible. The disagreement between
Berkeley and Hobbes about the existence of matter thus depends
on how they differ fundamentally on what they mean in saying
that something is ‘sensible’ (i.e. meaningful).
It is surprising, then, to see how similar their descriptions are of
what makes sense regarding the obligations of subjects in the
body politic. Those similarities, as Peter Geach points out, indi-
cate that ‘the debt Berkeley owes to Hobbes is quite obvious.’1
And as Arthur D. Ritchie remarks, at least in terms of his doctrine
of passive obedience, ‘Berkeley has to be careful not to invoke
Hobbes in support.’2 For, like Hobbes, Berkeley seems to subor-
dinate acts of conscience so much to the will of the sovereign that
individuality and natural self-interest appear to be challenges to
rationality and the fulfilment of God’s plan for the well-being of
humanity.
69
1. Peter T. Geach, God and the soul (London, 1969), p.126.
2. Arthur D. Ritchie, George Berkeley: a reappraisal (Manchester, 1967), p.139.
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Unlike Hobbes, though, Berkeley does not assume that a sub-
ject’s individuality is dissolved when it merges with the individual
wills of others in the formationof the state.Nor does he think that,
in choosing to do God’s will, subjects surrender their natural
individuality in becoming one with God. To endorse either con-
clusionwould assume that subjects are naturally individuals in the
firstplace, and this is exactlywhatBerkeleydenies. Forhim,passive
obedience does not require the self to cede some supposed abor-
iginal right to pursue its own self-interests; for, apart from God’s
will and the will of the sovereign, there is no way to think of a self
intelligibly as being an individual with natural rights.
This article is intended to show how, in their doctrines of
political agency, Hobbes and Berkeley assume that submission to
the laws of the sovereign is the basis not only for the forensic
constitution of human subjectivity but also for the possibility of
shared knowledge and moral responsibility. I suggest that, be-
cause the laws of the sovereign are formulated in linguistic terms
– as the language of nature or as pronouncements of the supreme
political power – they authorise not only what is proper for each
human subject but also how each subject becomes a ‘proper’ (i.e.
moral) individual in virtue of his or her participation in and
endorsement of those linguistic structures.
Berkeley’s and Hobbes’ theories of political obligation are thus
similar because they both assume that the identification of a self
as capable of political (and thus moral) obligation depends on
one’s accepting the fact that God and the sovereign determine the
contexts in which the subject is intelligible as a political or moral
being. For both thinkers, to be a subject in a political sense means
to be subject to the laws of the sovereign in exactly the same way
as being a passive recipient of ideas fromGodmeans to be subject
to divinely constituted laws of nature. For, just as perceiving
something (including oneself) as intelligible for Berkeley means
perceiving it in the context of the language of nature, so also for
Hobbes being able to think of oneself as a subject means inscrib-
ing oneself in a network of sensible signs established by the
supreme power.Where they differ is in how they think this appeal
to a system of signs is intended to show how (as Hobbes claims)
naturally individuated selves can be reconciled with one another
or how (as Berkeley maintains) selves can be considered individ-
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uals only in virtue of God’s will that there be a harmonious variety
of perspectives of the universe.
When Berkeley tells Samuel Johnson, then, that ‘the soul of
man is passive as well as active’, he is referring not only to how we
passively receive some ideas and actively imagine others but also
to how we identify (or refuse to identify) ourselves as intelligible
subjects in actively affirming (or refusing to affirm) the harmony
of God’s or the sovereign’s will.3 In this way, Berkeley links the
concepts of passive obedience and conscience in his political
theory to his otherwise puzzling views of the passivity and activity
of mind in his metaphysics. The purpose of my remarks is to show
how this connection is made more explicit by highlighting
Berkeley’s relation to Hobbes.
Berkeley’s interest in the Hobbes–Descartes exchange
Not surprisingly, Berkeley rarely refers to Hobbes. In his
published works, he associates Hobbes with those ‘pantheists,
materialists, and fatalists’ whose ideas on freedom and immor-
tality amount to ‘little disguised’ atheism.4 But his most extensive
discussion of Hobbes occurs in a series of Notebooks entries on
Hobbes’ 1641 objections to Descartes’s Meditations.5 There
Hobbes agrees with Descartes that the activity of thinking or
willing is distinct from the subject that thinks or wills; but he then
adds, ‘It seems to follow from this that a thinking thing is some-
thing corporeal.’6 Descartes is astonished by this, noting that it is
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3. Berkeley to Johnson, 24March 1730, in Philosophical works, ed. Michael R. Ayers
(Rutland, VT, 1992), p.354.
4. See for instance Notebooks (henceforward NB), in Philosophical works, ed.
Michael R. Ayers, p.252-336 (no.17, 824-25, 827); A Treatise concerning the
principles of human knowledge (henceforward PHK), in Philosophical works, ed.
Michael R. Ayers, p.61-127 (sections 93-94); Three dialogues between Hylas and
Philonous (henceforward DHP), in Philosophical works, ed. Michael R. Ayers,
p.129-207 (213); The Theory of vision vindicated and explained, in Philosophical works,
ed. Michael R. Ayers, p.229-50 (section 6).
5. From NB, no.795 to NB, no.837 Hobbes is mentioned twelve times.
6. Thomas Hobbes, ‘Objections 3’, in The Philosophical writings of Descartes (hence-
forward CSM), ed. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch,
3 vols (Cambridge, 1984-1991), vol.2, p.122. Subsequent references to the
Hobbes–Descartes exchange will be marked as CSM II with page number.
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‘quite without any reason, and in violation of all usage and all
logic’ (CSM, II, p.124) to insist that all substances are bodies. After
all, he remarks, it is widely acknowledged that some substances
are spiritual and some are corporeal. In the words of Robert
Pasnau, ‘it is as if Hobbes has forgotten that he still needs to show
that all things are bodies.’7 So Hobbes’ ‘utterly unsupported
inference from an act’s needing a subject to that subject’s being
corporeal’ seems to be based on an unjustified assumption that
whatever exists has a spatial location and is thus an extended
body.8
For Hobbes, of course, the assumption is far from unjustified,
and the inference from the relation between a subject and its acts
to the corporeality of the subject is obvious precisely because no
subject can be understood apart from the perceived (and thus
spatially located) acts that define it as that specific being. That is
why, as he claims in his 1640 Elements of law, we cannot conceive of
a thing unless we imagine it as a body with spatial dimensions.9
Apart from a thing’s engagement in some sensible activity of the
imagination, ‘it’ cannot be identified and thus does not occupy a
place in our mental discourse.10 For Hobbes, the activities of
mind (e.g. thinking, willing) are intelligible only as things we do.
Since what we do is intelligible only in terms of our acting in some
perceivable way, any thought or volition is identifiable as that act
specifically in virtue of its being a perceived corporeal activity,
not in virtue (as Descartes would have it) of its being a mode of an
immaterial substance (CSM, II, p.125).
Regarding Hobbes’ point, Berkeley says he is ‘of another mind’
(NB, no.797), for, as he makes clear elsewhere (PHK, }27; DHP,
p.240), he objects to characterising the understanding and es-
pecially the will as faculties distinguishable from the mind. With-
out doubt, he objects to Hobbes’ depiction of mind as material,
but he does not object to Hobbes’ view that the will should be
understood in terms of discernible actions instead of in terms of
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7. Robert Pasnau, Metaphysical themes 1274-1671 (New York, 2011), p.327.
8. Pasnau, Metaphysical themes, p.326; also p.327-28, 332.
9. See Thomas Hobbes, Elements of law: natural and politic (henceforward EL), ed. J.
C. A. Gaskin (New York, 1994), I.11.5, p.66.
10. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (henceforward Lev), ed. Michael Oakeshott (New
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modes of some spiritual substance. On several occasions Berkeley
reiterates Hobbes’ points that (1) the will is always understood in
terms of actions that are distinguished by their effects (NB,
no.788), (2) these actions are realised in bodily movements,11
and (3) an agent is known qua agent ‘so far forth as he can do what
he will’.12 Apart from perceived actions, Berkeley insists, there is
no publicly available way to speak about acts of will.
Berkeley thus sees the exchange betweenHobbes andDescartes
as a missed opportunity for Hobbes to have recognised howwill is
the principle of activity that defines a substance and that radically
differentiates it from its objects (i.e. ideas). As Berkeley notes, ‘not
distinguishing twixt will and ideas is a grandmistake withHobbes.
He takes those things for nothing which are not ideas’ (NB,
no.806). In Berkeley’s view, those things that are the causes of
ideas (viz. volitions) are not themselves ideas but rather ex-
pressions of will or activities of mind that identify the objects
of mind. As far as Berkeley is concerned, Hobbes is correct in
insisting (contrary to Descartes) that there is no mental substance
distinct from its activities. Hobbes’ only mistake is that he pre-
sumes that, if activities are sensible, they must be material. The
dispute between Berkeley and Hobbes thus ends up turning on
how each identifies the mind’s activities in terms of their sensible
objects.
Hobbes and Berkeley on conscience
Both Berkeley and Hobbes realise that identification of the will
with its acts is central in their accounts of political identity
(especially regarding the role of conscience). For both, our will
to engage in a certain activity is nothing other than our engaging
in that activity. Of course, because of external constraints or
ignorance of our abilities, we often will to do things we cannot do.
But, even in those cases, we end up doing exactly what we will to
do, namely, act in a way that is either intentionally or negligently
uninformed about our place in the world. This leads Berkeley a
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11. De motu, in Philosophical works, ed. Michael R. Ayers, p.209-27 (section 25).
12. Alciphron, or the Minute philosopher (henceforward A), in Works, vol.3, p.21-329,
dialogue 7, section 19.
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few Notebooks entries after his comments on the Hobbes–
Descartes exchange to say, ‘the grand mistake is that we know
not what we mean by we ourselves, our mind, etc. ’Tis most sure and
certain that our ideas are distinct from the mind, i.e. the will, the
spirit’ (NB, no.847). Specifically, Descartes’ grand mistake lies in
not knowing what the mind is, that is, in mistaking it for a
substance that is conceptually distinguishable from activities of
will. In doing so – and this is what is important for our present
purposes – he makes the mind inaccessible to political analysis.
For his part, Hobbes’ grand mistake lies in thinking that the
volitional activities of mental substance are themselves ideas (i.e.
corporeal objects). But at least his identification of the mind in
terms of its actions has the virtue of revealing how conscience
cannot be understood apart from observable activity. It is this
feature of Hobbes’ critique of Descartes that Berkeley appropri-
ates in his own account of conscience.
Indeed, unlike some of his contemporaries (notably Locke), for
Berkeley acts of conscience are not exemplary cases of politically
significant acts unperceived by others. That is, to act
conscientiously is not to rely on private moral insights, for to
do so would ignore how universal laws of nature are themselves
‘suggested and inculcated by conscience’.13 Instead, Berkeley
describes acting on conscience as acceding to the will of the
supreme power. By means of such consent, individuals are
integrated into the harmony of creation, and passive obedience
to the sovereign becomes not only a moral law but also a law of
nature that is obligating in a distinctly moral way – that is, as
imposing a moral rather than merely prudential duty (PO, }33).
Berkeley’s point is that, in obeying the will of the sovereign, the
individual accepts his role in God’s scheme. This consent, like the
‘union and consent of animals’ (A, I.16), is something we do in
virtue of identifying ourselves as political and ethical beings, but
it is not a distinct action we perform. Rather, it is simply how we
think of the way our actions are related to one another and to
God. So instead of thinking of conscience as something a person
has, Berkeley portrays it as something a person does – namely,
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13. Passive obedience, or the Christian doctrine of not resisting the supreme power (hence-
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acting in a way in which we share a sense of the propriety of
something with others in a con-science. Accordingly, in perceiving
the world conscientiously, we identify ourselves as distinctly
moral beings.
Themodel for thinking this way is found in the ‘perfection, and
order, and beauty of nature’, all of which are ‘worthy of the
imitation of rational agents’ (A, I.16). In fact, ‘it is not possible for
free intellectual agents to propose a nobler pattern for their
imitation than nature, which is nothing else but a series of free
actions produced by the best and wisest Agent’ (PO, }14). Through
the laws of nature, God reveals how all things are coordinated and
should not be considered in isolation from one another. That is
why ‘man ought not to consider himself as an independent
individual, whose happiness is not connected with that of other
men; but rather as the part of a whole, to the common good of
which he ought to conspire’ (A, I.16).14 To think of oneself as an
individual first and only subsequently as a member of a moral
community is to ignore how God initially creates all things as
inherently related to one another. It is this insight that underlies
Berkeley’s assumption that rational agents are justified in think-
ing that their actions should aim at being harmonised with the
actions of others. But, as Berkeley himself notes in Alciphron, the
fact that nature exhibits a universal harmony that could serve as a
model for morality does not demonstrate how any individual’s
well-being has ‘a necessary connexion with the general good of
mankind’ (A, I.16). What is needed, he suggests, is an argument
that shows how individuals become moral beings – and not
merely different bodies – by considering themselves as intrinsi-
cally related to others.15
That is where returning to Hobbes helps us, for it is Hobbes
who provides the explanation for why an ‘act’ of conscience is not
really my act (even though it is something I do) when I acknowl-
edge my relation to other actors as the communal context of the
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14. See also Paul J. Olscamp, The Moral philosophy of George Berkeley (The Hague,
1970), p.118.
15. Olscamp hints at such a solution when he notes that the necessary connection
between moral laws and our well-being depends on recognising how minds
are related to one another and God in terms of how mental acts are linked to
their effects. See his Moral philosophy, p.65.
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action. Hobbes explains this point by noting that the word
‘conscience’ literally means an act of con-science. Conscience,
he observes, originally referred to the mutual witnessing of
something that bound someone to another in terms of shared
knowledge (Lev, 7.4):
When two or more men know of one and the same fact, they are
said to be conscious of it one to another; which is as much as to
know it together [con-sciousness]. And because such are fittest
witnesses of the facts of one another, or of a third, it was and
ever will be reputed a very evil act for anyman to speak against his
conscience [con-science]; or to corrupt or force another so to do:
insomuch that the plea of conscience has been always hearkened
unto very diligently in all times. Afterwards, men made use of the
same word metaphorically for the knowledge of their own secret
facts and secret thoughts; and therefore it is rhetorically said that
the conscience is a thousand witnesses. And last of all, men,
vehemently in love with their own new opinions, though never
so absurd, and obstinately bent to maintain them, gave those their
opinions also that reverenced name of conscience, as if they would
have it seem unlawful to change or speak against them; and so
pretend to know they are true, when they know at most but that
they think so.
To act against one’s conscience, Hobbes argues, is to deny what
one communally knows is true – that is, to present a private
opinion as if it is a publicly discernible judgement. But a ‘private
judgement’ is an oxymoron, because a judgement by its very
nature requires an appeal to the public context of a language.
Accordingly, Hobbes refers to a judgement as the ‘resolute and
final sentence of him that discourseth’ (Lev, 7.2). In identifying an
opinion as an act of conscience, we acknowledge the public
(discursive) character of our pronouncement as that which is
regulated by laws we do not determine and cannot change at will
by pretending they are of our own creation (EL, II.25.12).16 The
idea that conscience could be understood as a private or personal
criterion of meaning can therefore be taken only as a later
perversion of the word’s original meaning.
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For Hobbes, then, an individual in a commonwealth must
submit to the ‘public reason’ of the sovereign (i.e. ‘the reason of
God’s supreme lieutenant’, Lev, 37.13), because the sovereign
establishes (by means of civil law) the rules for intelligible dis-
course and publicly defensible judgements. By identifying with
the sovereign, we become identifiable as individuals with con-
sciences. That is why ‘a man’s conscience and his judgment is the
same thing’ (Lev, 29.7), for to act conscientiously is nothing else
than to ‘settle’ one’s judgement in a way that adheres to the rules
established by the sovereign (EL, II.25.12). We might imagine a
‘private conscience’ – that is, a judgement regarding something
about which the sovereign has notmade any pronouncement (EL,
II.25.12). But because such a conscience would rely on no com-
mon discursive context, it could not provide any defensiblemoral
guidance for an individual. Indeed, for Hobbes, the very concept
of an individual’s moral duty, like the principle of individuation
itself, is simultaneously ontological and semantic, for, as he says,
‘we must consider by what name anything is called, when we
inquire concerning the identity of it.’17 We thus have to rely on the
public reason of the sovereign to determine how concepts such as
conscience and natural law are intelligible in the first place.
To put this in terms of Berkeley’s language of nature: acts of
conscience (properly understood) are acts of will that affirm
God’s will that we perceive objects as useful for our communal
well-being. To follow one’s conscience is not to act in a way that
contrasts the will of the subject with that of the supreme power.
Instead, in consenting to the will of the sovereign, the conscien-
tious subject acknowledges that the will of the self is ultimately
God’s will as it is enacted in a publicly observable (localisable) way.
To accept one’s place in God’s scheme is to act with an awareness
of how all things are united in God. That is why Berkeley says that
‘conscience always supposeth the being of a God’ (A, I.12). By
contrast, in a ‘specious’ character, ‘there is nothing of conscience
or religion underneath, to give it life and substance’ (A, III.2). So
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17. English translation of De corpore, in The English works of Thomas Hobbes, ed.
William Molesworth, 12 vols (London, 1839-1845), vol.1, 11.7. See also Yves-
Charles Zarka, ‘First philosophy and the foundation of knowledge’, in The
Cambridge companion to Hobbes, ed. Tom Sorell (Cambridge, 1996), p.62-85 (72).
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no one who ‘acts’ out of a bad conscience truly acts or is really a
person ‘under the law’. For thatmatter, someonewho acts out of a
bad conscience is not even a substance.
I thus reject Stephen Darwall’s view that by ‘conscience’
Berkeley means ‘an awareness that the act is contrary to God’s
will, together with a knowledge of the sanctions God will apply’.18
For even if God’s will and sanctions are involved in morality, that
does not explain how God’s will is necessarily linked to an
individual’s conscience. For that we have to explain how moral
principles and habits include not only conscience but also ‘affec-
tion, passion, education, reason, custom, [and] religion’ (A, III.6).
Darwall concedes that Berkeley’s account of normativity or
oughtness is based ultimately on being motivated by non-moral
goods (i.e. pleasure and pain).19 But, as Darwall concludes, a
theory of motivation provides no real theory of moral obli-
gation.20 That is why he claims that Passive obedience sends ‘mixed
signals’ about how we would agree on which rules to accept or
upon which consciences to rely.21 He says that is also why
Berkeley conflates truly moral obligation with prudential obli-
gation: ‘the normativity of the moral ‘‘ought’’ – its power to
obligate – derives from the very same source as that of prudential
obligation. It is because we inescapably see our own greatest good
(and because conforming to God’s rules is necessary to realize
that), that morality obligates.’22 So Darwall is right in saying that,
for Berkeley, our actions are not morally obligating because they
promote universal happiness, and that God wills that we follow
laws which, ‘if universally practiced’ (PO, }8), will promote the
happiness of all.23 For, as Berkeley insists, ‘nothing is a lawmerely
because it conduceth to the public good, but because it is decreed
by the will of God, which alone can give the sanction of a law of
nature to any precept’ (PO, }31). What Darwall leaves out, how-
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18. Stephen Darwall, ‘Berkeley’s moral and political philosophy’, in The Cambridge
companion to Berkeley, ed. Kenneth P. Winkler (Cambridge, 2005), p.311-38
(317).
19. Darwall, ‘Berkeley’s moral and political philosophy’, p.321-23.
20. Darwall, ‘Berkeley’s moral and political philosophy’, p.323.
21. Darwall, ‘Berkeley’s moral and political philosophy’, p.332.
22. Darwall, ‘Berkeley’s moral and political philosophy’, p.326.
23. Darwall, ‘Berkeley’s moral and political philosophy’, p.325, 332.
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ever, is Berkeley’s point that what makes our actions obligating is
the fact that God wills that they be universally practised, that is,
that we ‘concur’ in following them (PO, }10). As long as conscience
is understood as the prerogative of the individual, there will be
‘no politeness, no order, no peace among men, but the world is
one great heap of misery and confusion’ (PO, }16). When we
realise, though, that by definition acting conscientiously means
consenting to God’s will that all things be known in common,
then we will see how moral obligations are essentially linked to
the possibility of moral agency.
This means that ‘it is absolutely necessary several independent
powers be combined together, under the direction (if I may so
speak) of one and the same will’ (PO, }16). For in acknowledging
that the will of God or the sovereign is the source of my ability to
be a moral being, I indicate how my volitions are intelligible only
in a context that is not of my own creation. Berkeley does not shy
away from this seeming subsumption of the individual’s will into a
universal will, even though he recognises such pronouncements
warrant the caution ‘if I may so speak’. For in NB he notes, ‘The
Spirit, the Active thing, that which is Soul and God, is the will
alone’ (no.712). What prevents Berkeley from becoming a full-
blown Hobbesian or even Spinozist is the fact that, due to
differences in how we perceive things – that is, how we ‘consent’
to the universe – we are necessarily and universally obligated to
think of ourselves as moral and political beings (i.e. as having
consciences).
To be a good citizen, then, means to be loyal to the supreme
power of the state (PO, }3). Such loyalty requires that we submit to
thewill of the ruler,whichmeans acting according toprecepts that
have ‘anecessary tendency’ topromote thewell-beingof all human
beings (PO, }10). If precepts were morally obligatory only if they
promoted our well-being, then observing moral rules (including
passive obedience) would merely be contingently obligatory. By
framing that relation as necessary, Berkeley links moral actions
intrinsically to conscientious behaviour (PO, }3, 7).24
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To show how such a linkage can be made, Berkeley argues that
certain ways of behaving (e.g. truthfully, justly) are necessarily
connected with our universal well-being in virtue of the ‘general
frame and circumstances of human nature’ (PO, }15). Our moral
obligations are necessary because we become moral agents only
by ‘consenting’ (i.e. con-senting) to our experience as a harmony.
For Hobbes, our sinful condition leaves the sovereign as the only
real prospect for such consent. But, by focusing on the immanent
cause of experience (viz. will), Berkeley keeps agency at the heart
of morality.
Concluding remarks
Berkeley’s moral and political philosophy is thus not a version of
natural-law theory or theological rule utilitarianism.25 Unlike
natural-law theorists, he does not describe ethics in terms of
values (e.g. sociability) that apply generally to the human species;
rather he bases moral obligation on how each individual ex-
presses a promise of perceiving the harmony of all experience in
a unique way. Unlike utilitarians, he does not assume that we are
individuals with competing interests; rather he portrays moral
perfection as an effort to enhance and coordinate the variety of
our perceptions. By identifyingmoral agents in terms of how they
apprehend things as ordered according to laws, Berkeley provides
a way to frame his theory as a theologically inflected version of
deontological ethics by relating moral laws directly to the con-
stitution of the self. This insight, I have suggested, is more notable
when we compare his view of conscientious activity to that of
Hobbes.
One final point: it is not surprising that Berkeley is often
thought to espouse a form of utilitarianism. After all, he does
remark, ‘It is not therefore the private good of this or that man,
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are necessary to the preservation and well-being of our bodies’; and PHK,
}151: ‘operating according to general and stated laws is [...] necessary for our
guidance in the affairs of life.’
25. See Darwall, ‘Berkeley’s moral and political philosophy’, p.314, 326-33; and
Matti Ha¨yry, ‘Passive obedience and Berkeley’s moral philosophy’, Berkeley studies
23 (2012), p.3-14.
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nation, or age, but the general well-being of all men, of all nations,
or all ages of the world, which God designs should be procured by
the concurring actions of each individual’ (PO, }7). Instead of
focusing on the utilitarian-sounding first half of this sentence,
however, I want to emphasise the final phrase, namely, that God
designs that this general well-being ‘should be procured by the
concurring actions of each individual’. It is not God’s design that
each of us should promote the general good, for that would only
validate a way of thinking of moral agents as isolated
(‘Hobbesian’) individuals. Rather, it is God’s design that the
general good be procured by thinking of our distinctly moral
actions as necessarily concurrent. As Hobbes notes, that requires
that we not think of ourselves as agents with private consciences,
for to do so only subverts God’s (or the sovereign’s) design and
undermines the possibility of truly moral (versus merely pruden-
tial) behaviour. Instead, according to Berkeley, we need to learn
how to think of even the most passive of our experiences as
opportunities for recognising the intricacy of their relations. In
this sense, he does not differ much from Hobbes.
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